Where Risk is Mispriced in Private Credit

Most of the current discussion around private credit risk is directionally right.
But it’s focused in the wrong place.

Capital is reacting to perceived risk in:
– software credit
– broadly defined “consumer” exposure

While overlooking a segment where:
– borrower quality is stronger
– demand is structurally anchored
– and the real constraint isn’t credit… it’s conversion

The result is not just inefficiency. It’s mispricing.
This note lays out:
• where that mispricing exists
• why it persists
• and how value is shifting away from balance sheets toward transaction infrastructure

Including one of the more underappreciated dynamics in the market today:
→ alpha being created not through underwriting… but through capturing transactions the system currently fails to close

Credit Score Primer

Most people think of credit scores as a number.


Lenders know it’s a signal: but often the wrong one, or at least an incomplete one.

What’s more interesting is how that signal is shifting underneath us… and what it means for capital allocation, pricing, and risk selection going forward.

Credit Score Primer — LEHNS Capital Advisory

National Average FICO Score (2024)

715

The U.S. average has risen 26 points since 2010 and has not declined on an annual basis for eleven consecutive years — reflecting broad improvement in consumer credit behavior despite rising debt levels.

Total U.S. Consumer Debt (Q4 2025)

$17.7T

Credit card balances alone reached a record $1.21 trillion. Yet delinquency rates remain below pre-2008 levels — illustrating the bifurcated economy where high earners manage debt well while lower-income households face increasing strain.

Income & Credit Correlation

Median FICO Score by Household Income Tier

Income is not a direct input to any FICO or VantageScore model. However, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found a strong indirect correlation — higher incomes enable lower credit utilization ratios, more consistent payment histories, and access to higher credit limits, all of which significantly influence scores.

Low Income

658

< 50% of area median income

Fair range

Moderate Income

692

50% – 79% of area median

Fair range

Middle Income

735

80% – 120% of area median

Very Good

High Income

774

> 120% of area median

Very Good

Median score by income tier

FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax · Income tiers per FFIEC methodology

FICO score tiers

Score ranges and approximate U.S. consumer share

TierRangeU.S. share
Exceptional800–85024.0%
Very Good740–799~17%
Good670–739~30%
Fair580–669~13%
Poor300–57916.3%

71.2% of Americans hold a Good score or higher. Approximately 26M adults are "credit invisible" — no score at all.

Credit score distribution by income tract — Eighth Federal Reserve District (2025 Q1)

Percentages of adults by subprime / prime / super-prime classification across census tract income levels. Source: St. Louis Fed / FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax Q1 2025.

Subprime <580 Subprime 580–659 Prime 660–719 Super-prime 720+

Analysis

Key Findings

Credit utilization

Higher incomes enable lower utilization ratios — the second-most-important FICO factor (30% of score). Consumers with Very Good scores average 12.4% utilization vs. 32.6% for those in the Good range. Average utilization nationally surged to 36.1% in early 2026, up from 21.3% in 2024. — Experian; WalletHub / TransUnion

Payment consistency

Payment history represents 35% of FICO score — the single largest factor. Income volatility in lower-income households materially increases the risk of missed payments. A median score of 658 for low-income borrowers puts many below the 720 threshold lenders typically require for favorable terms. — Federal Reserve Board; FRBNY (2020)

Credit limit constraints

Lower-income applicants typically receive smaller credit limits, making it easier to reach high utilization even with modest balances — creating a structural disadvantage that perpetuates lower scores and limits access to affordable credit products. — LendingTree; Consumer Federation of America

Correlation is moderate, not deterministic

The Federal Reserve Board found household income is only moderately correlated with credit scores. Cross-sectional income variations account for a modest fraction of score variation — many lower-income consumers maintain good or excellent credit through disciplined payment behavior. — Beer, Ionescu & Li, Fed FEDS Notes (2018)

Geographic stratification

Average scores range from 725 in Minnesota to 677 in Mississippi — a 48-point national spread. In low-income census tracts, over 53% of adults carry subprime scores; in upper-income tracts, 67.5% hold super-prime scores of 720+. — FICO; St. Louis Fed Q1 2025

Credit invisibility

Approximately 26 million U.S. adults (roughly 10%) have no credit record whatsoever — they are "credit invisible." An additional 19 million have records too thin or outdated to generate a score, disproportionately concentrated in lower-income and minority communities. — Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Sources

Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The State of Low Income America: Credit Access & Debt Payment (2020, 2022) · Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System — Beer, Ionescu & Li, "Are Income and Credit Scores Highly Correlated?" FEDS Notes (August 2018) · Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis / FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax, Access to Traditional Credit in the U.S. and the Fed's Eighth District (Q1 2025) · Experian, What Is the Average Credit Score in the U.S.? (2024–2025) · FICO Credit Insights Report (2025–2026) · Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) — Credit Invisibility Study · LendingTree Credit Score Statistics (2024) · WalletHub / TransUnion Average Credit Score Statistics (2026)

Registered Representative of and Securities Products offered through BA Securities, LLC. Member FINRA SIPC. LEHNS Capital Advisory, LLC and BA Securities, LLC are separate, unaffiliated entities. The information contained herein is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or an offer to buy or sell any security. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Oil Shock Amnesia- Mispricing Duration Risk in Energy-Driven Credit Cycles

Every time oil spikes, the market reacts the same way.

Prices move. Headlines follow. Models update.

And then, a few weeks later, everyone moves on.

What gets missed is the variable that actually matters for credit:
not how high oil goes - but how long it stays there.

Consumers don’t default the month gas prices rise.

They default 6–12 months later. After savings are depleted, credit cards are maxed, and income compression compounds.

We just published a short note on what this means for subprime auto and specialty finance.

The takeaway is uncomfortable but clear:

the next credit event in this sector won’t begin with unemployment, it will begin with gasoline.

The Refinery Gap Why This Energy Shock Will Hit Subprime Auto Faster Than Expected

Two numbers are running the economy right now. Investors are looking at one. Consumers are paying the other.

They are not the same number.

The market is about to learn why that matters. This is not a credit problem. It’s a capital problem.

Energy shocks like this don’t just increase losses, they compress the timeline.

Delinquencies show up faster. Funding tightens sooner.

And by the time ABS spreads move, the outcome has already been determined.

Infrastructure vs. Exposure The New Fault Line in Subprime Auto Finance

Two auto lenders.

Same dealers. Same borrowers. Same credit profiles.

One is scaling. The other is tightening originations. The difference isn’t credit performance. It’s capital.

What’s happening in subprime auto right now isn’t a gradual deterioration, it’s a structural separation between platforms that control their access to capital and those that depend on it.

That distinction is starting to show up in funding costs, growth rates, and ultimately, outcomes.

By the time it’s obvious in the data, it’s already too late.

SUBPRIME AUTO TERM ABS SECURITIZATION OVERVIEW 1Q 2024

Subprime auto securitization in 1Q 2024 by the numbers …

$57 BILLION.
Volume of new issue auto securitization in 1Q 2024.

Issuers are not taking their foot off the gas as the first quarter demonstrated; instead, they’re accelerating rapidly, setting a pace to demolish the industry’s $143 billion record issuance in 2023.

23 PERCENT.
Proportion of issuance that was subprime.

Investors continue to demonstrate voracious appetite for debt back by subprime auto obligors.

$556 MILLION.
Average size of a subprime auto term transaction priced in 1Q 2024.

With 5 transactions containing $1 billion or more in collateral, big deals are common, with three issuers coming to market more than once in the first quarter.

Learn more in the attached “Subprime Auto Term Securitization Overview 1Q 2024”

Download the Overview today to learn more.